Hi, Welcome to the 20th Special Edition
Brief Overview of What We will cover in this Issue
Detailed Key Takeaways from the book I am reading Currently
4 Decent Articles to read and Key Takeaways from them.
Investing during the war and whether should you worry or not
Key Points you should know before investing in Microcap Business
When you holding stocks fall…….
Small-MidCap Bear market (2018-19 ) Experience from FM’s View
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WHEN TO SELL
In investing it is never wrong to change your mind. It is only wrong to change your mind and do nothing about it.—Seth Klarman, Margin of Safety
Remember, there are two markets for stocks. Or if you prefer, there are two prices. The quoted price is just one of these two prices, and it shouldn’t dominate your decisions.
Investors with a portfolio of sound stocks should expect their prices to fluctuate and should neither be concerned by sizable declines nor become excited by sizable advances.
SIMPLE SELL IDEAS
You sell when your original reason for owning a stock is no longer true.
Fisher had a very slow trigger finger when it came to selling. He believed that if the job of stock selection was done correctly, the time to sell would be almost never.
In an interview with Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, Marty Whitman talks about when to sell:“ I’ve been in this business for over fifty years. I have had a lot of experience holding stocks for three years; doubled, and I sold it for somebody else, for whom it tripled in the next six months. You make more money sitting on your ass.” Whitman, though, also acknowledges times when he sold and wished he sold even more: “We sold a lot of the high-tech early in 2000, and I regretted not having sold much more. It ended up that what we held was a garbage portfolio.”
Selling is hard, in part because it’s so easy to look like a fool later. Whitman says,“ We’re just not that smart on the sell side.” Few investors, if any, really are. It’s nice to hear such candor from one of the best in the business.
“DOLCE FAR NIENTE”
Dolce far niente (pronounced, “DOL-chay far nee-EN-tay ”) is an expression that roughly means, according to William and Mary Morris, “The sweetness of doing nothing.”
Inactivity can be a very intelligent thing to do.
For investors, there is a compelling analogy in all of this. Great investors often talk about paying attention to risks. Warren Buffett, Marty Whitman, Seth Klarman, and others— all focus first on the downside. They first look to answer the question, “How much can I lose?” Only then do they compare how much they could lose with how much they could make. They want to cover their downside and avoid mistakes (losses). Most average investors don’t do this at all. They focus on making gains. They want to know how much they can make.
This is such an important concept— yet so overlooked. Everyone loses now and then. And sometimes investors lose big. But the idea is that over the long haul you accumulate far more winners and avoid many big losers.
You still can’t be afraid to change your mind. If it’s five months in and you can show you were in error in your analysis, then you shouldn’t be afraid to sell.
If you’re routinely buying and selling stocks at a quicker pace, then you’re not really investing— you’re trading,
however, it’s short because the basic idea of when to sell is easy in principle. It’s much tougher in practice, of course. But if you keep the ideas in this chapter in mind, they should help in your decision-making.
ON DOING THE WRONG THING
→ Investors are more prone to believe that finding the next great growth stock in a big, exciting industry is the key to building a great fortune. Not so, says professor Jeremy Siegel.
While I don’t always agree with the ever-bullish Siegel, he presents some interesting ideas. Siegel, a Wharton professor and author of Stocks for the Long Run (which, ironically, contributed to much of the myth that stocks at any price are good bets over the long haul), does present some interesting research that shows how some of the best investments of the past half-decade emerged from industries with horrible dynamics. And some of the worst investments have come from the most hyped and popular industries.
→ Peter Lynch admits that most of his losers came from betting on sexy technology companies in growth industries.
In the 1980s, disk drives were the hot item, and analysts forecast growth rates of 50 percent for years. This, in fact, did happen. The problem was that something like 30 companies was competing for the same business, and none of them could make a buck.
→ In any event, Siegel shows that there have been some real gems in industries that most investors would not have given a second thought to. An interesting example of this phenomenon occurred in the railroad industry, which Siegel discusses in the book. The railroad industry has been shrinking since the mid-1950s. The creation of a nationwide highway system spurred competition from the trucking industry. And the growth of the airlines ate into the railroads’ passenger business. Most people look at the railroads as a dying business, a stagnant, old-world relic. Siegel’s research shows how railroads stocks not only beat out the airlines and trucking industries but even topped the S& P 500 itself. So, despite some bankruptcies and other problems, investors were able to come out well ahead when things improved— even if they improved only a little bit. The history of railroads shows us how several industries in a long decline can still post excellent returns.
The key point here is that valuations matter. It’s not about industry prospects or what the growth rate is. It’s not about having positive demographics or supportive macro trends.All of these things can be useful to know and understand, and they can help or hurt an investment in a lot of ways . . . but if you don’t consistently buy stocks when they are cheap, these other things are probably not going to save you from subpar returns.
One final example: Siegel puts IBM up against Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Exxon) in 1950. IBM had better forecast growth rates in revenues, in dividends, and in earnings per share. Moreover, its industry was projected to grow 15 percent per year, while Standard Oil’s was projected to decline 14 percent per year. Yet which stock provided the better return from 1950 to 2003? Standard Oil and it wasn’t even close. If you had invested $ 1,000 in both stocks in 1950, you’d have had $ 960,000 worth of IBM in 2003 versus about $ 1.3 million in Exxon. The difference was that IBM traded at much higher valuation multiples than Standard Oil. Again, it’s all about the price you pay. That’s your El Dorado, as unglamorous as it seems.
INNOVATIONS ARE NOT ALWAYS IMPROVEMENTS
Innovations are not always improvements, and this is especially true in investing. People are always coming up with seemingly novel ways to make money in the markets. Books come out all the time touting some new way of thinking or some new system. The “newness,” however, is more apparent than real.
Most of these new ways just die after a while. There is little that is new in finance. The same principles apply in nearly all markets. I visited a local used book shop the other day, looking to sell a box of books I no longer wanted. I didn’t care how much they paid me. I just wanted to get rid of them and clear some space on my shelves. Many of the books were about investing, markets, or economics. As the bookseller picked over the lot, he left many of the investing and economics books in the box and bought the other books. “I’m always surprised at what you take and don’t take,” I said to him. “For example, you took a copy of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, but you wouldn’t take this brand-new book about investing.” This bookseller is a crusty fellow, with a face like a dead squirrel. “Well,” he said in a very deliberate manner, “most of what’s worth reading about money and investing has already been written.” This was a fairly wise observation, I thought. He continued: “People love to come to a used-book store and pick up copies of the classics that have been around for a hundred years or more. The problem with the new stuff is that we don’t know what will stick. What’s popular today is forgotten tomorrow.”
The markets of yesterday were not so different from markets today, as I was reminded when reading Humble on Wall Street, published in 1975.
Money manager and former Forbes columnist Martin Sosnoff wrote the book, a memoir of his investing experiences in the ’60s and early ’70s.
Wall Street and investors generally have little patience. Their tastes are constantly changing. As a result, cycles have become an unmistakable feature of markets, like the nose on a man’s face.
Optimism is a cheap commodity on Wall Street. There people believe in America every day of the year— and they’ll sell it to you for a pretty penny, too!
if you do the micro work well, the macro stuff becomes less important (think of micro as the gritty details of companies and specific investments, and macro as the bigger picture of industries and economies). Cheap valuations, or a margin of safety, will pull you through a lot of adversity, just like a St. Bernard dog pulls travelers from Alpine snowdrifts.
But it is often better to fish around where there are fewer fishermen. In other words, look at markets that are not now in the headlines.
ONLY DEAD FISH SWIM WITH THE STREAM
Most people want to buy strong companies with growing sales and expanding markets and a bright future. No one wants to buy a company that has problems to work through, that has been hit with one setback or another, or that has a murky and uninviting outlook in the short term.
Yet it is in these latter opportunities that the greatest investors have plied their trade and milled their fortunes. Warren Buffett bought the Washington Post in the throes of the 1973– 1974 bear market when it was struggling. He bought 10 percent of the company for about $ 10 million. At the time the company had revenues of over $ 200 million. Ten years later Buffett’s stake was worth $ 250 million.
He bought GEICO when, in his words, “it wasn’t essentially bankrupt, but it was heading there.” It was one of his greatest acquisitions. Not just Buffett but scores of wealthy investors have enjoyed incredible returns by buying when other investors were fearful and by seeing through the temporary setbacks.
The greatest investors did not fear going against the consensus. As writer Malcolm Muggeridge used to say, “ Only dead fish swim with the stream.
The paradoxical nature of market returns was brought to light in a book titled Capital Account: A Money Manager’s Reports from a Turbulent Decade, 1993 – 2002 and edited by Edward Chancellor (author of the acclaimed Devil Take the Hindmost ). The book collects financial reports written by Marathon Asset Management’s partners and delivered to its clients over the boom years.
The book is interesting because it illustratesMarathon’s unconventional investment style and provides a number of useful ideas and examples of investments that succeeded by bucking consensus opinion. Consider General Dynamics, a company that Marathon backed in the early 1990s. General Dynamics was in bad shape at the time, suffering from a declining backlog of business in the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise. New management took the company in a different direction in 1991 by closing or selling unprofitable businesses and buying back its own depressed shares. The stock of General Dynamics increased sixfold between 1990 and 1993 even though its sales were reduced by half. Yes, sales declined by 50 percent and the stock rose sixfold! Marathon used the example to highlight a couple of key points regarding its “capital cycle approach” (which I’ll get to in a minute).
Investment returns can have less to do with sales and growing markets than with the efficient allocation of resources. In this case, the management of General Dynamics took the existing resources of the company and dramatically changed the way those resources were deployed. Instead of frittering resources away on unprofitable business lines, management focused on its core business. Even though this involved effectively making the business smaller, investors were rewarded with an outsized gain in the stock price during a relatively short amount of time.
Second, Marathon pointed out that General Dynamics benefited from a decline in competition, as money was withdrawn from the defense sector or diverted to other areas and the existing businesses consolidated. It is better to invest in a mature industry where competition is declining than in a growing industry where competition is expanding. ”
Marathon’s “capital cycle approach” is based on a simple yet compelling idea. High returns on capital, or the prospect of high returns on capital in one area of the market, attract additional investment. This additional investment puts downward pressure on returns in that market.
Think about the Internet bubble. When the Internet was still new, the first few firms in the space commanded large market caps relative to the amount of capital invested in the business or the amount of money required to start the business. As a result, more money kept pouring into dot-com businesses.
Let me give you Chancellor’s distillation of this idea, and you will never forget it.
He wrote,“ When a hole in the ground costs $ 1 to dig but is priced in the stock market at $ 10, the temptation to reach for a shovel becomes irresistible.”
Using the capital cycle approach, you would become suspicious when shares are priced on the assumption that existing returns are going to be maintained or improved in light of rapidly expanding new investments and growing capacity in a business or industry. In other words, the approach helps guard against the error of simply extrapolating prior returns into future years. The capital cycle approach forces you to think about competitive pressures.
The process works in reverse as well. As share prices decline, investment capital moves off to find greener pastures, and competition declines. As excess capacity is sweated off, though, returns are likely to improve. Here is where the opportunity lies, as share prices in these situations are often priced assuming the pessimistic present conditions are permanent. But as things improve and the market naturally adjusts, these companies may provide outsized returns for far-seeing investors. General Dynamics did exactly that.
HEDGE FUNDS: HISTORY SAYS MORE BLOWUPS ARE ON THE WAY
Hedge funds are not an investment but a compensation scheme.
The average hedge fund rose 13 percent in 2006, lagging behind the 13.6 percent increase of the S& P 500 index. Why pay all that money to hedge fund managers when you can do better in an index fund?
And this doesn’t mean that there aren’t some hedge funds out there worth every bit of the extra money. But it does cause you to rethink the whole boom a bit, doesn’t it?
Now, dear reader, we bring the thing round to investing. In investing, it can be hard to determine who is lucky and who really has something that works. There are lots of stock pickers out there who have runs of winning stock picks. But the results don’t necessarily mean they are great stock pickers. They could simply be lucky. Anyone can compile a short-term record of excellence. Luck can play a large role in short-term investment results. Moreover, stellar short-term results are not often sustainable or replicable. Investors should seek a style that has worked over a longer period of time in a variety of markets.
People had a hard time believing he was simply lucky. They had to rationalize in their minds what he had done; they had to attribute it to some“ system.” In the world of equities, we often do the same thing. Some money manager gets hot and compiles a wonderful three-year (or less) track record, and everyone wants to anoint this manager as the next guru. We must remember that it is possible he or she was simply lucky. There are thousands of money managers and thousands of stock pickers, and it is not unusual to expect that several will be hot for no reason other than luck.
The investment style or philosophy of the investor can give us clues, too, especially when we don’t have a long track record to evaluate. Ask yourself: Is there a system or style here that is consistent and makes sense? During the Internet boom a number of mutual funds, for example, compiled outrageous track records speculating in Internet stocks. This was an instance of simply being in a hot market, and most of these funds did not have a real underlying investment thesis to back them up. They picked Internet stocks because they were Internet stocks, not because of any special investment insights. There was nothing behind them; they were just like Wells and his roulette wheel gambles.
You can have extraordinary runs of luck, good or bad, that are unexplainable in terms of any system that might reproduce such results consistently. In investing, there are plenty of people with results that do not reflect the underlying merits of their approach. But we have to pay attention to the how and why of those results. Because, in the long run, all these things will get sorted out and the phonies will be exposed.
SMALL QUESTIONS, BIG OPPORTUNITIES
Television and radio and the free dailies thrash out the big questions. Everyone has an opinion. Answers to the big macro questions are mostly free. They’re given away because few people will pay for them.
Most people don’t know that famed economist John Maynard Keynes was actually a fairly accomplished investor. Even though I loathe the snarl of ideas he unleashed on the realm of economics, he had some interesting things to say about investing. As the steward of King’s College’s endowment from 1928 to 1945— a difficult set of years, given the Great Depression sandwiched in between— he managed an average return of 13.2 percent. This looks especially sweet considering that the overall market in the United Kingdom actually lost money during those years, declining by an average of 0.5 percent per year.
Keynes’s basic philosophy was to buy cheap, out-of-favor investments, hold on for a period of years, and concentrate the portfolio on his best ideas— as opposed to buying a little bit of lots of ideas.
Keynes’s contrarian investment style could be difficult to implement. He had to get his ideas past an investment committee. Investing, I believe, is something that can’t be done well by the committee. It is best to have one guy make the ultimate decisions.
Keynes once recommended Argentine bonds. The committee nixed the idea, essentially saying the outlook for Argentina was no good. That response prompted the witty Keynes to reply: I want to again explain my investment philosophy. It’s called contrarianism. And what that means is that the stuff I like is stuff that the average person, when they look at it, won’t like, and, indeed, will think it imprudent. So the fact the committee doesn’t like it is the best evidence for it being a good investment.
On another occasion, the market was falling apart, and the committee asked him if he should be reducing his exposure. Keynes wrote back: “I wouldn’t consider it imprudent to own a few shares at the bottom of the market. Your apparent investment approach is that I should be liquidating as the market gets more attractive and that I should be buying as it goes up.”
My favorite Keynesian line is about taking losses. He wrote: “I consider it the duty of every serious investor to suffer grievous losses with great equanimity.”
His ideas became the basis of a new highly mathematical approach to economics, which encouraged big government spending and active management of the economy. That’s a topic for another place.
DON’T PANIC WHEN YOUR STOCKS FALL
For most people, when a stock they own is down, they get nervous. They think about selling. Most people are not dealmakers.
For the true dealmaker, market prices are just that— market prices. They are not well-reasoned appraisals of business value.
Let us not look back in anger, nor forward in fear, but around in awareness.—James Thurber, American writer
Successful long-term investing is about more than just finding cheap stocks. It’s about finding those little connections that the market doesn’t yet see or appreciate. It’s about understanding why something may be cheap and seeing how the market could be wrong.
Excerpts and Learning from Articles/Blogs
1) What the Science of Hitting can Teach you about Better Decisions
Making decisions within our circle improves the odds we’ll do well. This is our sweet spot and it’s different for all of us.
The problem is everyone wants to have a large circle. We think bigger is better. But the size of the circle is not really what’s most important.
Knowing the boundaries of our circle of competence is more important than its size. As Richard Feynman pointed out, familiarity with something is different than competence.
Warren Buffett, elaborating on the same topic, wrote:
If we have a strength, it is in recognizing when we are well within our cycle of competence and when we are approaching the perimeter. Predicting the long term economics of companies that operate in fast-changing industries is simply far beyond our perimeter. If others claim predictive skills in those industries—and seem to have claims validated by the behaviour of the stock market we neither envy not emulate them. Instead, we just stick with what we understand. If we stray, we will have done so inadvertently, not because we got restless and substituted hope for rationality.
In some decisions, such as investing, we can choose to do the same thing. We can sit around, read, and wait for the right opportunity. Most decisions, however, are not of that nature.
Knowing the boundary of our aptitude, where we bat above average and where we don’t, can help guide those decisions and how we make them.
Making decisions outside of our circle of competence (i.e., we don’t know what we’re doing) is riskier than making decisions inside our circle (i.e., where we do know what we’re doing.)
Whatever decision you’re making, know where it falls in your strike zone.
2) When Bad Things Happen to Good Stocks
“Quality seems like a good feature to have in a company—but not quality at any price,”
It’s never certain, however, that investing in any particular one of these factors will provide a durably superior return in the future—especially given the perennial tendency of investors to jump in with both feet after a period of hot performance only to bail out when returns go cold.
3) Ian Cassel: 6 smart tips for micro-cap investors (Best Read)
1) When it comes to investing, don’t be a chicken, be a hawk.
Don’t be afraid to say no to 99.9% of investment opportunities. You only need to find one great company, before others, to change your life.
The visual capabilities let the hawk distinguish the size, shape, and speed of the potential prey so it can recognize, target, and capture it quickly.
Be picky.
2) Don’t bother finding the next multi-bagger if you are not going to develop the conviction to hold it.
Stocks rarely perform in the time frames we predict, and it’s why the market only works for investors that have a long-term portfolio focus.
You sometimes have to hold onto a position for a few years before it goes up 100% in 3 months.
sustainable multi-baggers often take their time to ascend and develop. If you’re invested in great businesses that continue to grow and earn more money, don’t let lulls in stock price and boredom scare you out of them.
Many of us, seeing we have made a profit of 40% in one of our stocks, start actively looking for another company to invest the money into – instead of leaving it invested. This is precisely why lots of investors never become very successful.”
As human beings, we are very impatient. The hardest part of maturing as an investor is allowing ourselves the time. You can’t force it. Many investors “force it” by being active for activity’s sake.
Investors tend to over-analyze when stocks are going down (fear) and under-analyze when stocks are going up (greed). The hardest part of investing is holding through these times, embracing boredom and inactivity, and distancing human nature-emotion from investment decisions.
3) Learn to differentiate between business performance and stock performance.
Great businesses have great stocks. Great businesses always get overvalued. It’s important to make investing decisions based on business performance, not stock performance. It’s also important to know the distinction between external stock market forces driving a stock price lower (buying opportunity) versus business reasons you are not aware of (you should be selling).
4) Avoid piling into a position at one go.
All my winners had one thing in common, I was always averaging up. Most of my losers had one thing in common, I was always averaging down..
I buy my first third after extensive due diligence and after talking to management.
I buy my second third after traveling and meeting management at their headquarters
I buy my last third after the management team does 25% of what they say. The majority of microcaps overpromise and underdeliver. You make money on the ones that underpromise and overdeliver. It takes time to make sure you are betting on the right jockey.
My personal investment philosophy is to buy microcaps that I think can be 5-10x in a few years. It might sound insane, but I don’t buy stocks where the peak potential return is less than 100%.
5) Successful investing isn’t about being right all the time; it’s more about the ability to identify when you are wrong quicker.
Always keep your ego to the minimum. The market loves to humble boastful investors.
When you find yourself constantly averaging down it’s normally a sign that your ego has taken over. You’ve convinced yourself you have to be right, but you forget that being broke and right is the same thing as being wrong. Your ego clouds your judgment and slows your thinking. Many investors have gone broke trying to prove the market wrong, and you certainly aren’t going to prove yourself right by throwing good money after bad.
6) The management makes the difference.
The smaller the company, the more should be the focus on management and qualitative analysis. CEOs of small microcap companies tend to wear a bunch of hats, so their influence is much greater than larger companies. Founders are the difference makers.
Microcap investing is really entrepreneurial investing, which means you really need to talk to management. I’m cautious in saying this because not every small investor should expect to be able to call up and talk to management. The point I’m making is on quarterly conference calls, etc. take advantage of the opportunity to ask good questions.
I want to invest in owner-operators that have an intense focus, integrity, energy, and intelligence.
Intelligent Fanatic = (Long Term Vision + Focus + Energy + Integrity + Intelligence) x Execution
The combination of all these traits multiplied by execution is what makes an “intelligent fanatic”. Many investors mistake an executive with charisma for being an intelligent fanatic. The microcap space in particular is filled with snake oil salesman and executives that talk too much and do too little. Don’t mistake storytelling, charismatic CEO as an intelligent fanatic. In fact, many intelligent fanatics are not charismatic. Intelligent fanatics let their execution do the talking.
In conclusion, keep this in mind:
I like companies with no debt, or at least low debt. Small companies and debt just don’t go well together. Travel light, travel far.
Cash flow, not reported earnings, is what determines long-term value. Undiscovered companies that can sustain 30-40+% growth rates from internally generated cash flows are hard to find.
Look for owner-operators with intense Focus, Integrity, Energy, and Intelligence.
For a small microcap company to be a market leader, it must dominate a small market. I want to own businesses that dominate a small market that is expanding. This normally pushes quality attributes down to the financials.
Look for a clean capital structure. I look for low outstanding shares, all common shares, and a low amount of warrants/options as a percentage of outstanding shares. You want to invest in management that treats its shares like gold.
I prefer no institutional ownership. When you find and invest in great businesses that bigger money doesn’t own, the stock has nowhere to go but up.
Find repeatable, sustainable, profitable growth. My biggest risk as a microcap investor is dilution. I want to find companies that are self-funding their growth.
Buy when the business is fundamentally undervalued to limit risk and to fully leverage multiple expansions. Your margin of safety is buying an undervalued business that can get overvalued.
What counts in the long run is the increase in per share value, not overall growth or size.
4) The Dark Room of Investing Success
The benefits of waiting, and of patience, have long been documented in the annals of investing history, through the experience of some of the best investors the world has seen. Despite that, and despite the fact that humanity, on an average, has gotten more intelligent over time, we seem to be getting more impatient as years pass.
Many of us, many of the time, want results “now,” instead of wanting to wait. For many of us, we do not want to have to go through the process, the journey, the uncertainties, the darkroom. We just want to see the light and arrive at the end destination. Even more, we think it’s unfair to wait.
Every time you avoid selling your stocks even when others are selling theirs or the markets are crashing, because you are investing with a process and have your eyes on the long run, you are going through your own version of the darkroom.
Something to remember is that progress is progress, no matter how small, and no matter how many darkrooms you have to pass through on your way.
Small Video Clips
➢ Jatin Khemani’s Interview with CFA
Small-MidCap Bear market (2018-19 ) Experience while Running advisory ( 45:30 To 50:14)
How to get a job as a fresher for an Equity Research Analyst (A Good Way)
(56:42 To 1:00:10) (Slightly Off Topic)
➢ G Maran’s webinar with PMS AIF World (Worth watching the entire webinar)
Valuable data insights on Indian Domestic Consumption | Who drives consumption (40:11 To 53:48)
G Maran on New Age Business (Unique View) (55:56 to 1:00:40)
➢Samit Vartak Interview with Niraj Shah (Alpha Moguls)
Fund Manager’s view on Current Market Scenario (Understand how they look at markets)
What is Samit Vartak doing with their Holdings (03:42 To 06:36)
Don't jump in & out of themes Frequently! & Which type of company you should look at while buying Auto Sector (16:57 to 18:44)
Sagaone High Conviction Bets (19:52 To 21:52)
Sagaone Multibagger Returns formula! (31:19 to 32:59)
➢ Vijay Kedia Latest Interview
Vijay Kedia on the current situation of Investing during the war and whether should you worry or not. (10:13 to 13:21)
Don't get too excited for the current hot sector, it may take longer time to play than you expected (Ex. Solar and EV) (19:36 To 21:06)
Portfolio Churning (37:26 to 39:36)
Don't get dependent on Demat Value, Always Diversity (42:06 to 45:45)
Brilliant piece!! 🙌